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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 219

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 14/03/1998

Where it occurred: Trebinje, Nr Dubrovnik,
RS
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: RM/LS/SL/EB

Date of main report: 25/03/1998
Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast

Ground condition: electromagnetic
hard

Date record created: 16/02/2004

Date last modified: 16/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
dog missed mine (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)

Accident report
A Board of Inquiry report was made on behalf of the relevant government body (not the MAC
which was then UN controlled). The BOI report was made available by the country MAC. The
investigators included an ex-pat Technical Advisor and QA staff, although the accident was
not classed as a demining accident because it did not occur during formal demining. What
follows is a summary of the report. The full report (edited for anonymity) is in Related papers
at the "Other documents" tab.
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The demining group were undergoing training in preparation for an anticipated joint demining
contract with an international demining company. The weather in their home area was bad
so they went to Trebinje to "refine drills and procedures".
The accident occurred in a suspected mined area where no detailed records were available.
Mines in the area were mostly PMA-2 and PMR2-A. Both types were found when the area
involved was cleared in January 1998 (by a commercial company).
The area was mountainous with much of the land having a thin soil cover that made it
generally accepted that prodding to the required depth was "difficult". The "high metal
content of the ground" could make it impossible to use detectors. The favoured demining
method for the area was explosive detecting dogs.
The training programme on the day included marking practice and demining drills using
manual methods and dogs. The victim was putting in route markers. "During this task he
apparently stepped onto a mine which activated, causing extensive injury to his right foot and
lower limb". The mine was 1.2 metres inside the area marked as clear by the previous
commercial company. The training exercise included full medical support and the victim was
evacuated to Trebinje hospital within 25 minutes.
The investigators, from experience and in the absence of fragments, decided that the crater
was a typical PMA-2 crater, and PMA-2s were known to have been in the original minefield.
"Based on the evidence of a series of tests conducted on this type of mine in similar soil
conditions" the investigators concluded that the mine had been 13-14cm below the surface.
They considered this depth "at the extreme limit of optimum performance of the best
detectors" and "below the normal depth for prodding".

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the mine had been missed during the earlier clearance
tasks. Also that the training area was "extremely hostile" and easier sites could have been
used. The investigators observed that the UN MAC Technical Guides "give no real guidance
as to what alternative procedures should be undertaken" when detecting and prodding are
inadequate in an area. In previous missed mine incidents in the area (involving two other
commercial companies) the mines were also PMA-2s.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that explosive detecting dogs be used in the area and in
sites with similar conditions. [They were used by the group that missed the mine in this
accident.] It was felt that the fact that other mines were found close to the missed-mine
during the original clearance may have confused the dogs - "the scent pattern could have
permeated the ground to some distance from the mines" - and they recommended that the
limitations of dogs be recognised.
Revisions to the make-up of investigating boards were suggested, along with the formulation
of technical guidance for work in such areas.

Victim Report
Victim number: 283

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 25 minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: none
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Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because the victim and his
group appear to have been working responsibly during training when the accident occurred
in an area that should have been safe. The secondary cause is listed as a
“Management/control inadequacy” because if the MAC’s QA and QC systems worked, the
previous clearance of the area would have rendered it safe.
The investigation of the accident was annotated aggressively by UN MAC staff who
appeared to have resented an outside report and did not know how to react to suggestions
from an outside body. The approved demining methods in use ought to leave cleared land
safe for civilian use. In fact a commercial company had found three mines on an area of
ground previously cleared by a UN MAC team and other devices had been found on land
supposedly cleared by other groups. The need to find new ways of improving the clearance
standard was obvious, and the failure of the UN MAC to recognise this was a serious failing.
The investigator's suggestion that dogs be used in PMA-2 areas despite their observation
that the dogs also missed the mine involved in this incident, is strange.

Related papers
Other documents in the file included reports of other missed mine incidents, a sketch map of
the site and the crater. There were also photocopied and indistinct photographs of the site.

Original investigation report
What follows is the original investigation, edited for anonymity.
Report of the Investigation into the Mine Incident in the Trebinje Area on 14th March 1998 by
the Republika Srpska Investigation Board.

General
1
A mine incident occurred on the morning of 14th March near Trebinje in an area
that had been mined but which had been cleared under the terms and conditions of a
previous PIU (World Bank) contract. A [Demining group A] deminer was injured during the
incident which occurred while the company was involved in a non-operational training
programme, conducting site preparation drills as refresher training prior to commencing a
survey and clearance contract. The deminer, [name excised], suffered a traumatic
amputation of his right foot above the ankle. No other injuries were sustained.
2
Due to the special circumstances of the incident the RS Demining Commission
member and PIU Director, [name excised], requested that the RS International Technical
Advisor and three RS Quality Assurance and Accident Investigation members conduct an on
site investigation. This was convened on 16th March and the investigation was completed on
17th March 1998.
3
The board members were selected for their knowledge and experience of
demining, the local area and accident investigation procedures. It should be noted that with
effect 31 March, or the establishment of the EMAC, a team of similar composition would
conduct all future investigations.
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Mine Incidents and Mine Accidents
4

The UN MAC Technical Guidelines define accidents and incidents as follows:
a
A mine accident is defined as an accident involving a mine/UXO, caused during
a demining or EOD operation.
b
A mine incident is an accident involving a mine/UXO not caused during a
demining or EOD operation.

5
The UN MAC Technical Guidelines also state that mine incidents can be
reported by anyone as the incident can involve any person. The standard form, shown in
Technical and Safety Standards Guidelines, should be completed for input into the Mine
Database. Mine Accidents that are caused by demining or EOD operations are to be
investigated thoroughly, with the aim of preventing a repetition of the accident.
6
Under the terms of the UN MAC Technical Guidelines the event referred to is
officially termed as an incident, and as such should be reported to the Republika Srpska
police for investigation. Where possible a report, using the format outlined in the UN MAC
Technical Guidelines, should be forwarded to the UN MAC to allow inclusion of the data in the
Information DataBase. This report has also been submitted to the UN MAC. However, due
to the fact that the incident took place in a previously mined area, and involved a Republika
Srpska demining company, the PIU Director decided that a technical investigation should be
conducted. It is understood that the local police have conducted their investigation.
[Demining group A]
7
The Republika Srpska has two commercial demining companies, [Demining
group A] based in Pale and [Demining group B] based in Banja Luka. [Demining group A] has
been the more active of the two companies having undertaken several Emergency Demining
contracts for the UN MAC and was a logistic support and local co-ordinator to [Demining
group C], an International Demining Company, during the previous RS PIU contract.
8
The [Demining group A] Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been
accredited by the UN MAC and all members of [Demining group A] teams have previously
passed recognised demining qualification training on either US State Department, [Demining
group D] or [Demining group E] basic demining training courses.
The 1998 PIU Contract for the RS
9
The latest PIU Contract for the Republika Srpska has been awarded to
[Demining group C] who have previously utilised [Demining group A] for logistic, support and
co-ordination . [Demining group C] has not yet completed it’s mobilization plans or agreed the
terms of the contract with the PIU. No members of [Demining group C] were present at
Trebrinje before or during the training undertaken by [Demining group A].
[Demining group A] Training Plans
10
[Demining group A] teams were conducting basic demining training in
preparation for future demining contracts, under the authority of the director of [Demining
group A]. Due to winter weather conditions in the Pale region the company personnel
travelled to Trebinje to further refine drills and procedures.
Ground Conditions in Trebinje Area
11
An evaluation of the ground conditions in the Trebinje area were conducted by
the board members. Trebinje is in the southern part of the Republika Srpska, close to
Dubrovnik on the Mediterranean coast. It is a mountainous region, consisting mainly of rocky
terrain, sparse scrubland with limited areas of agricultural land. The majority of the rock and
soil has a high metallic content, making it unsuitable for the majority of metal detectors
currently in use in BiH. In many areas there is little soil covering the rock and what soil there
is very compacted, making normal prodding procedures impossible in many locations. This is
described in more detail later. During the winter period the vegetation can be easily cut using
normal clearance techniques.
The Mine Threat in the Trebinje Area
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12
The IEBL and areas adjacent to it in the Trebinje area have, as would be
expected, been heavily mined. There are a large number of records of minefields in this area.
It is also known that several minefields were rapidly laid by the Serbs, of which no records are
available; the PIU has been informed that no records were kept. The incident occurred in one
of these areas. This will also be referred to later in this document.
13
The majority of mines found in this area are PMA 2 (minimum metal content
mines) and the PMR 2A (fragmentation stake mines). Both types of mines were found and
cleared during clearance work in January 1998 on the site where the incident occurred.
Annex G details the amount of mines removed from this site during the recent [Demining
group C] clearance task.
Previous Work in the Area
14
Trebinje has been nominated as one of the priority areas for clearance and there
are a large number of refugees in the area, a figure of 20,000 was given to the board
members during discussions with refugee support workers in the area. This figure has yet to
be confirmed. The PIU tasks in this area have been at the request of the Ministries of
Industry and Reconstruction (Electrical and Power). And are considered important for the
reconstruction programme.
15
Over the past year a series of priority tasks have been given to three demining
organisations in order to facilitate the clearance of mines in this area. The contracts are
detailed below.
a

[Demining group D]

[Demining group D], acting on behalf of the US State Department and tasked by the UN MAC,
conducted clearance operations in the Trebinje area in March 1997, the site was some 38
kilometres from the centre of Trebinje on a site said to contain mainly PMA 2 and some TM
500 mines.
b

UN MAC

UN MAC demining teams from Banja Luka region, acting on behalf of UN MAC Sarajevo,
conducted clearance operations in the Trebinje area during December 1997. The site was 11
kilometres South West of the centre of Trebinje and contained PMA 2 and PMR 2A mines.

c

[Demining group C]

The Republika Srpska PIU, as part of the 1997/98 contract, tasked [Demining group C] to
conduct survey and clearance work in the Trebinje area. Tasks B002 and B003 cleared the
area beneath electrical power lines to facilitate repair and reconstruction of this part of the
power grid. The site is about 11 kilometres South West of the centre of Trebinje and
contained PMA 2 and PMR 2A mines. It is very close to the UN MAC site detailed above.
See Annex A for a map of the area illustrating the survey and clearance work undertaken
during these tasks.
Previous Accidents/Demining Incidents in the Area
16
The particularly hazardous conditions are well known by all demining
organisations who have worked in this area. All have commented on the difficulty of
conducting normal prodding procedures to the required depth, i.e. to a depth of 10 cm as
specified in UN MAC Technical Guidelines. The high metal content of the ground makes the
use of metal detectors redundant. Normal demining procedures therefore cannot be used in
this area except in very limited areas of the terrain. The best ‘tool’ therefore, when available,
is the EDDs. To use EDDs correctly special drills and procedures need to be devised and
adhered to. This is referred to in the Summary and Recommendations.
Missed Mines
17
The difficulty of conducting clearance operations in this area has been explained
above and an historical check of work conducted in this area has revealed that only the three
companies mentioned above have worked in the area in the last eighteen months. Of these,
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two of the companies have had accidents; occasions have also been documented where
mines have been found after the clearance has been conducted.
a
[Demining group D] - A mine accident occurred on 14 March 1997. The mine
detectors being used were the Schiebel AN 19/2 and the detectors signalled even when there
was no metal to be found in or on the ground (the ground has a high metal content). The use
of a prodder was deemed as difficult due to rocky terrain and shallow soil coverage. In the
investigation summary it states that the deminer had ‘missed’ the mine and had passed over it
twice before it detonated on the third traverse. It should be noted that the accident
investigation board consisted of 3 USDCC members and 1 from the UN MAC. See UN MAC
report at Annex B.
b
UN MAC - A mine accident occurred on 17 December 1997. The mine detector
used was the MD 8, the report states that the detector could not function effectively due to the
high metallic content of the soil and that prodding was extremely difficult due to rocky terrain.
It recommended that excavation must be done and concluded that the mine was ‘missed’ by
the team during the clearance operation. It should be noted that all members of the board
were UN MAC personnel. See UN MAC report at Annex C
18
In addition, [Demining group C] found three mines on an area of ground, which
had previously been cleared by a UN MAC demining team. See report at Annex D.
19
The incident of 14 March 1998 occurred on an area of land that had been
cleared as part of Tasks B002 and B003. See map at Annex E. The [Demining group A]
deminer injured in the incident of 14 March 1998 was on a site previously cleared by
[Demining group C] and would appear to have activated another ‘missed’ mine.
Events Leading to the Incident
20
The [Demining group A] training programme on the day of the incident included
marking and practice clearance drills, using manual methods and EDDs. The site previously
cleared by [Demining group C] was being used to prepare access routes, safe lanes and
outer minefield marking. The training programme was not evaluated, as it had no impact on
the incident. The statements indicate a series of normal instructions and events for demining
training.
The Incident
21
During the training phase [the victim] was putting in route markers near the edge
of the cleared area and painting the tops of the markers red. During this task he apparently
stepped onto a mine which activated, causing extensive injury to his right foot and lower limb.
The location of the mine was some 1.2 metres from the minefield marker, which had been
placed by [Demining group C] to define the extent of the cleared area. Photographs of the
site are at Annex F.
22
During the training phase the teams all had medical orderlies on site with full
equipment. A full casualty procedure was immediately activated and Basic Life Support
given. The casualty was carried to the ambulance medical vehicle in the CP for evacuation to
the local hospital. The CASEVAC was conducted well and took less than 25 minutes from the
incident to arrival at the Trebinje hospital.
23
Discussions with the doctor confirmed that the CASEVAC was well organised
and that the medical orderly had dealt with the casualty in an excellent manner.
Site Investigation
24
Statements were taken from all involved personnel, the statements confirmed
that normal training activities were being conducted. The site had been selected for training
activities, was clearly marked and had been ‘closed off’ in accordance with Technical
Guidelines. The site was checked by EDDs and deminers using prodders before the team
conducted the site investigation. The incident occurred some 1.2 metres from the edge of the
marked mined area.
25
The hole created by the explosion was 54 cms x 58 cms wide at the top with a
depth of 20 cms. The ground around and below the location of the explosion contained rocks
and very firmly compacted soil material. No metal, plastic or other material indicating the type
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of munition was in or around the hole. The shape of the hole was generally round with the
sides shaped to an estimated 50-degree angle. All RS members of the board had recently
conducted some 20 accident investigation tests in various soil conditions and agreed that this
was typical of a PMA 2 detonation. In addition a PMA 2 mine had been found during the
clearance task just 2 metres from the incident site, a PMR 2A had been removed
approximately 10 metres to the right. The minefield had contained only PMR 2 and PMA 2
mines. See the site map drawing and photographs at Annex E and F.
26
Based on the evidence of a series of tests conducted on this type of mine in
similar soil conditions the conclusion was reached that in probability the detonator was
approximately 13 – 14 cms below the surface. If a detector could have been used this would
have been at the extreme limit of optimum performance of the best detectors. This is also
below the normal depth for prodding.
Evaluation and Equipment Testing
27
During the investigation the normal methods of mine and munition detection
were investigated. The following comments are made:
a
Testing of metal detectors - A test was conducted on four types of detectors,
which were the MD 8, Ebinger 420 PB, the Vallon ML 1614 C and the Vallon ML 1620 B.
The test was conducted on several areas of several sites in order to obtain results from the
different types of ground conditions. The results confirmed that the majority of the area has a
very high metallic content making the use of metal detectors impractical. This conclusion was
also reached by the investigation into the [Demining group D] and UN MAC mine accidents
detailed above.
b
Battery Decay Tests - The mine detectors were all tested for several hours to
investigate battery decay and its impact on detector performance and effectiveness. Tests
conducted in the Trebinje area established that battery decay has a serious impact on the
effectiveness of the detector over a much shorter period than expected.
c
Prodding Tests - Prodding tests were conducted in order to establish the ground
conditions in the area and to determine the depth to which prodding activities might have
been successful during previous clearance operations. The tests confirmed that the prodder
could not penetrate the ground to an adequate depth without excavation. This conclusion was
also reached by the investigation into the [Demining group D] and UN MAC mine accidents
detailed above.
Summary
28
It is the Board’s opinion that the mine activated during the [Demining group A]
training was a missed mine in an area that had been previously cleared by [Demining group
C] during the early part of 1998 as part of task B002, task number 25/17. The training was
being conducted in an extremely hostile clearance environment and easier sites could have
been utilised. Although most companies would not have conducted training on previously
cleared or in such difficult terrain this was not considered to be an attributing factor.
29
This area of land is extremely difficult to demine. Previous accidents, missed
mines, lack of detailed records and the impractical use of the basic tools, ‘normal’ drills and
procedures make this area one to be treated with extreme caution.
30
Prodder and Detector performance in this area are, in most cases, impractical
and the UN MAC Technical Guidelines give no real guidance as to what alternative
procedures should be undertaken. All three contractors involved recently in clearance work
did not seem to have developed a technical answer to the problems created by the area, in so
much as no amendments appear to have been made to normal drills and procedures. In
agreement with the PIU [Demining group C]s clearance procedures were allowed to include
the use of dogs which were not part of the original contractual agreement.
31
The two previous accident investigation reports indicated that the missed mines
were both PMA 2 type Anti Personnel mines.
Conclusion
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32
While carrying out site marking refresher training the [Demining group A]
deminer appears to have stood on a PMA 2 mine which was missed during the previous
clearance operation undertaken by [Demining group C].
Recommendations
33
The use of EDDs has proved to be extremely effective during the US State
Department and PIU contracts in both the Federation and RS. The restrictions and limitations
imposed by the poor clearance conditions in the Trebinje area do not adversely effect the
EDDs’ performance, however it should be noted that EDDs were used on the [Demining
group C] clearance work in the area of the [Demining group A] mine incident. Nevertheless it
is strongly recommended that, where possible, dogs should always be used on sites with
such difficult clearance conditions but ‘normal’ drills may require modification.
34
The site records indicated that on the previous clearance task another mine had
been found in close proximity to the mine which detonated on 14 March 1998 with another 10
metres away. It should be recognised that since these mines had been in the ground for
some time the scent pattern would have permeated the ground to some distance from the
mines. Depending on wind conditions and the method of using the dogs it is not impossible
that the dog could have indicated the presence of explosives, a mine was found and assumed
to be the sole reason for the positive indication. When using dogs on mine clearance sites
their limitations must be recognised and procedures used must take these limitations into
account.
35
On difficult terrain such as this, consideration must be given to increasing the
amount of quality control that is undertaken on the site. For instance, most companies check
a 5-10% area of work, it may be necessary to increase this to as much as 20% in difficult
areas. This should be considered by the Technical Working Group.
36
Any area of land that has unique features requires special drills and procedures
to be adopted in order to ensure a safer and more effective clearance operation. This is
certainly the case in the Trebinje area. Special drills were not recommended or instigated
after the previous accidents, but they are strongly recommended by this report. Indeed
should any contractor be tasked to work in this area during any future RS PIU contracts, drills
and procedures will have to be developed and tested in an effort to ensure a safer and more
effective operation.
37
The definition of a mine accident and a mine incident contained in UNMAC
Technical Guidelines does not conform to the definitions contained in the UN International
Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance. As this is the definitive document for UN
operations it is recommended that the UN MAC Technical Guidelines should be amended
accordingly.
38
Accident Investigation Board members should not be members of the
organisation being investigated. The board should consist of independent personnel, a
member or members of the organisation being investigated should only attend as an
observer. It is recommended that this should be considered for inclusion in UN MAC
Technical Guidelines.
39
Guidance, drills and/or procedures for areas of land where it is difficult to utilise
the ‘standard’ equipment and methods should be outlined in more detail in the UN MAC
Technical Guidelines.
40
Future work in the Trebinje area must develop special drills and procedures in
order to address the difficult terrain and ground conditions of the area.
41
UN MAC Technical Guidelines and other documents refer to recommended
detectors but do not address the matter in sufficient detail. It is recommended that all aspects
of detector selection and use is reviewed with some urgency.
42
The RS PIU must review if it is necessary to undertake work over previously
‘cleared’ areas in the Trebinje. It is not known if [Demining group D] or the UN MAC have
undertaken such a review if not this is also strongly recommended.
Signed by members of the Investigation Board
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1
2
3
4

RS Quality Assurance Monitor
LRS Quality Assurance Monitor
RS Quality Assurance Monitor
Technical Advisor to the BiH Demining Commission

To

PM UN MAC

Date

25 March 1998

March 1998
March 1998
March 1998
March 1998

Subject: Investigation into the Mine Incident at Trebinje on 14 March 1998

Dear [Programme Manager]
Please find attached the report into the incident at Trebinje that occurred on 14th March 1998.
As explained in the report this incident has special circumstances and it was decided to
initiate a full investigation. A final copy of the report will be sent to the World Bank by this
department. Due to the intense interest shown by the US State Department I have, on this
occasion, included them in the distribution list. The final report can of course be distributed,
at your discretion, to all interested parties as deemed necessary. I understand that [The
World Bank TA] has been requested to explain the cause, circumstances, conclusions, the
historical background and technical implications at the next TWG.
It should be noted that we consider that there are several critical issues raised by this report
that require to be addressed. We should also like to know what work the UN MAC has
undertaken in the Trebinje area and what action was taken after the accident on 17
December in respect of this site. In the light of this investigation’s findings it is clear that
action should have been and must be initiated.
Please note that due to the composition of this team the text, statements and other
documents have taken some time to translate.
Yours sincerely

Copy to

World Bank - Washington
US State Department - Sarajevo
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